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RESE ARCH  BR IEF
Domestic Factors Could Accelerate the Evolution
of China’s Nuclear Posture
Since its first nuclear test in October 1964, China has maintained a modest strategic force designed to achieve limited deterrence goals. It has maintained a no-first-use 
policy and the ability to impose some risk of a second strike 
to deter attack. China’s restrained posture has made it an 
outlier in the nuclear world. In recent years, however, new 
trends have turned China’s outlier status on its head: 
While the United States and Russia have reduced their 
nuclear inventories, China has increased its strategic 
missiles and warheads and dramatically improved the 
quality of its force (Figure 1). China appears to be moving 
from a modest strategy of minimum deterrence toward a 
more robust strategy of assured retaliation, although China 
itself has not used either label (and talks instead about its 
requirement for a “lean and effective” nuclear deterrent). 
Although China is unlikely to change formal policy, it is 
developing capabilities that may ultimately allow it to engage 
in limited nuclear warfighting.
RAND Project AIR FORCE analysis finds that, while 
the strategic relationship with the United States continues to be 
the primary driver of the shift in China’s nuclear policy, a range 
of international and domestic drivers is likely to accelerate 
this trend over the coming decade. This brief focuses on three 
internal factors that could influence China’s nuclear direction: 
(1) a gradual shift from direct political control of nuclear policy 
to involvement by more-bureaucratic actors, (2) an increase 
in the size and status of the nuclear constituency within the 
Key findings:
Domestic drivers are likely to accelerate China’s nuclear  
modernization over the coming decade:
• Increased bureaucratic influence over nuclear force 
planning and policymaking
• Elevation of nuclear constituencies within the PLA
• Lack of organizational firewalls to prevent advances in 
conventional capability from influencing nuclear force 
structure.
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Figure 1. China’s Strategic Missiles and Warheads
Missiles
People’s Liberation Army (PLA), and (3) the lack of organiza-
tional firewalls to prevent advances in conventional capability 
from influencing nuclear force structure and creating pressure 
for changes in policy. These factors are consistent with the 
unitary-actor, bureaucratic-politics, and bureaucratic-process 
models familiar to policy analysts, but they have not been 
applied systematically to the study of Chinese strategic forces.
Increased Bureaucratic Influence over Military 
Policy
Since 1949, Chinese political leadership has largely con-
formed to the rational-actor model, in which the state behaves 
as a logical, unitary actor in response to external threats, 
pressures, and opportunities. The first generation of politi-
cal leaders in the People’s Republic had the confidence and 
means to direct military policy, as well as a clear consensus 
that only a small arsenal of nuclear weapons with limited 
capability was needed to achieve their deterrence aims. These 
views were translated into policies that limited the scale 
of China’s nuclear force-building. There is circumstantial 
evidence that senior leaders have, on at least two occasions, 
vetoed or postponed the deployment of capabilities (the 
neutron bomb and multiple independently targetable reentry 
vehicles [MIRVs]) that were within China’s technological 
means but would have represented a significant evolution 
in posture. In both cases, the scientific and military impe-
tus was unable to drive acquisition and deployment in the 
absence of political support.
Changes in Chinese leadership patterns since the mid-1980s 
have opened the state’s nuclear policymaking to greater 
influence from bureaucratic actors with narrower interests. 
Following his accession to power in 1978, Deng Xiaoping 
established regulations and procedures that would prevent 
one-man rule and encourage adherence to collective leadership 
under the Politburo Standing Committee. There has been a 
long-term trend toward the “regularization,” or bureaucratiza-
tion, of government, with the composition, roles, and func-
tions of different actors being better defined and, to an extent, 
respected in policymaking. These phenomena have extended 
into the military realm. Once, the members of the Central 
Military Commission were appointed and replaced at the whim 
of the party chairman, but both the size and composition of 
the body are now stable, with key military organizations being 
institutionally represented. Moreover, since the generation of 
Chinese leaders associated with Jiang Zemin assumed power in 
1989, civilian leaders have come to office with far less military 
experience and knowledge than their predecessors and have 
been more dependent on advisers and the military itself for 
information and expertise.
Chinese interlocutors almost uniformly suggest that 
military officials now have a larger role than they once did in 
key executive committees charged with nuclear procurement 
issues. Given these conditions, China’s military bureaucracy 
is likely to have greater scope to influence nuclear policy, 
especially as the organizations responsible for nuclear forces 
assume more-prominent roles within that bureaucracy.
Elevation of Nuclear Constituencies Within the 
Military Bureaucracy
The PLA has traditionally been dominated by the army, 
with the other services playing supporting roles. Over the years, 
however, the PLA Second Artillery Force (PLASAF) gained 
greater institutional standing. In 2015, the PLASAF was 
renamed as the Rocket Force and elevated from a military 
branch [兵种] to a military service [军中]. Former 
PLASAF officers were also appointed to the command 
and deputy command of the new Strategic Support Force, 
which gained control over most Chinese military satellites 
and cyber and information warfare functions. The change 
in formal status, and the political endorsement of the missile 
forces that has gone with it, will presumably make the 
Rocket Force a more capable advocate for nuclear weapons 
and delivery systems, for support systems that may still be 
lacking (such as space-based early warning systems), and 
for more flexible interpretation of policy and doctrine.
It is unlikely that Xi Jinping’s military reforms are 
complete, and it is unclear what future developments might 
hold. Some Chinese commentators have suggested that the 
PLA Rocket Force may ultimately be given responsibility for 
all Chinese nuclear forces, including submarine and future 
bomber elements, while others (probably more realistically) 
suggest that it may gain control of the ballistic missile 
defense mission. Either of these developments would have 
momentous consequences from the standpoint of bureau-
cratic politics, further elevating and unifying advocacy for 
both nuclear and conventional strike.
Whether or not the Rocket Force gains control of addi-
tional parts of the force structure, advocacy for a robust 
nuclear posture is likely to grow stronger in the years ahead. 
With the deployment of a substantial fleet of Jin-class ballistic 
missile submarines, the PLA Navy’s interests in China’s 
nuclear deterrent and deterrent posture have also increased. 
The PLA Air Force has restyled itself as a “strategic air force,” 
and although it has not stipulated a requirement for nuclear 
weapons, it will almost certainly push for long-range bombers 
that would be capable of delivering nuclear weapons. This 
bureaucratic landscape, combined with an international 
nuclear environment that Chinese strategists characterize as 
– 2 –
increasingly complex and challenging, is fertile ground for 
the further growth of Chinese nuclear capabilities. What kinds 
of capabilities are developed may be partly determined by 
organizational inertia and processes.
Lack of Organizational Firewalls Between 
Conventional and Nuclear Forces
At its inception, the PLASAF was charged exclusively with 
operating nuclear-armed missiles. For many years, Chinese 
nuclear forces were characterized by poor accuracy, long 
launch times, and a low-alert posture that prioritized tight 
control of nuclear warheads above survivability. These 
characteristics were consistent with China’s minimum-
deterrent doctrine and no-first-use policy: Such a strategy 
requires only a small number of missiles to survive an attack 
and emerge capable of hitting countervalue targets, such as 
cities and industrial centers, which do not require quick 
response or great accuracy. The same limitations do not 
apply to the PLASAF’s conventional missile strike mission, 
which it assumed in the mid-1990s. Recent technological 
advances have greatly improved the survivability, accuracy, 
and dynamic targeting capability of Chinese conventional 
missiles.
There are effectively no organizational firewalls between 
the conventional and nuclear elements of the force; uniformed 
personnel move back and forth between the two, and the 
force shares common research and development facilities and 
production lines. Consequently, in the absence of a strong 
political directive opposing such a move, advances in conven-
tional capability are likely to be applied to the nuclear forces. 
Capabilities might include greater missile accuracy to hit and 
destroy hardened counterforce targets; dynamic retargeting 
integrated with intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 
networks to enable nuclear forces to attack targets of oppor-
tunity; the ability to coordinate and launch large salvos; and 
the exercise of launchers under battlefield conditions.
Individually, these capabilities will enhance China’s 
ability to retaliate to a nuclear threat. Existing Chinese 
doctrinal writings already call for the ability to survive on a 
nuclear battlefield and to deliver “waves” of counterstrikes, 
even if China has never had the capability to execute such 
doctrine. When combined, these improved capabilities could 
also provide Chinese policymakers with a wider range of 
strategy options, up to and including a limited warfighting 
capability (Figure 2)—for example, the ability to respond 
flexibly for the purposes of escalation control or, potentially, 
damage-limiting strikes against a second-tier nuclear com-
petitor. New capabilities could prompt Chinese nuclear 
commanders to advocate for a de facto adjustment of nuclear 
operating concepts and doctrines, even if the capabilities 
themselves were not developed specifically for these purposes.
According to a rational-actor interpretation, an evolu-
tion toward a more capable nuclear force would be a clear 
indication that China’s leaders intend to move beyond a strict 
minimum deterrence strategy. But such changes could simply 
be the result of an organizational proclivity for continued 
incremental modernization. The two possibilities are not 
mutually exclusive; more important, the implications would 
be the same. Even if senior civilian leaders remained commit-
ted to the historically limited view of nuclear requirements 
(an open question), today’s leaders appear less involved in 
detailed oversight than their predecessors, opening the door 
to heavier influence from scientific and bureaucratic actors.
Implications for the United States
These internal factors, along with international drivers 
discussed in the main report, have the potential to drive 
Chinese nuclear forces, policy, and doctrine in directions that 
challenge U.S. and regional security interests. The enhance-
ment of Chinese nuclear capabilities, together with a shifting 
conventional balance, is likely to affect regional perceptions 
of Chinese intentions, its no-first-use policy, and the credibil-
ity of U.S. commitments. U.S. officials should be prepared 
for allies and partners to ask for clearer statements on 
extended deterrence, as well as material nuclear arrangements 
(e.g., requests for the redeployment of U.S. tactical nuclear 




































• Small inventory 
• Inaccurate
• No rapid launch



















most likely to diminish stability, increase escalation risks, 
or undermine prospects for arms control. Washington and 
Beijing still have common interests in avoiding unstable 
nuclear arrangements, and dialogue may encourage China’s 
political leaders to take a hand in shaping nuclear develop-
ments in ways that are less likely to undermine its stated 
policies.
also affect competition and conflict at lower levels, particu-
larly in the gray-zone conflicts that have come to characterize 
international politics in East Asia. Chinese leaders may push 
regional claims harder on the understanding that the United 
States has fewer escalation options.
Even as U.S. leaders take measures to reassure allies and 
partners, they should also engage China on developments 
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